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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-4624 
___________ 
 
DONNELLY J. LEBLANC, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CRAIG STEDMAN; 
BRIAN E. CHUDZIK; 
THOMAS B. ZELL; 
DEAN MORGAN; 
GEORGE PAPPAS; 
JOHN DOE, Chief of Police; 
COUNTY OF LANCASTER 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 10-05215) 
District Judge:  Honorable Timothy J. Savage 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 26, 2012 
 
Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR. and NYGAARD, Circuit 
 
Judges 
(Opinion filed: May 2, 2012 ) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
2 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
 Donnelly J. LeBlanc appeals, pro se, from a District Court judgment in favor of 
defendants in his civil rights action.  For the reasons that follow, we will summarily 
affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
I. 
The record reflects that on October 7, 2007, during a dispute with his wife, 
LeBlanc drove his pick-up truck into his wife’s Mercury Sable, pushing the Sable into 
their porch.  LeBlanc said he purposefully damaged the Sable because he wanted his wife 
to get a new car and he did not want to invest the time and money to fix it.  After the 
incident, LeBlanc and his wife drove to a nearby friend’s house.     
Background 
Detective Pappas responded to a report of a domestic disturbance and encountered 
LeBlanc and his wife at their friend’s house.  Pappas interviewed the LeBlancs and 
arrested LeBlanc for simple assault and recklessly endangering another person.  Pappas 
photographed the damage to the automobile, had it towed to a garage, and stopped by 
LeBlanc’s house to survey the damage to the porch.   
Pappas warned State Farm, the insurer of the LeBlancs’ cars and home, that 
LeBlanc might attempt to file a false insurance claim.  On October 10, 2007, LeBlanc 
contacted his insurance agent, requesting reimbursement for the $95 towing bill he paid 
as a result of the October 7, 2007 incident.  In making this request, LeBlanc 
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misrepresented the events leading to the towing of the Sable.1  LeBlanc’s insurance agent 
believed that he was submitting a claim for the towing expense and assigned a claim 
number to the request.2
In December 2007, State Farm investigators contacted Pappas, and they later 
faxed him their report regarding LeBlanc’s reimbursement request, including LeBlanc’s 
and his wife’s description of the incident that led to the towing of the Sable.  The report 
also indicated that LeBlanc was seeking a quick settlement.  After reviewing State Farm’s 
report, Pappas described the events to Assistant District Attorney Dean Morgan.  Pappas 
then prepared an affidavit of probable cause and criminal complaint against LeBlanc, 
charging him with criminal conspiracy and insurance fraud.  The complaint was signed 
by Chief Thomas Zell of the Akron Borough Police Department.  District Justice 
Willwerth issued a warrant for LeBlanc’s arrest on January 8, 2008, and LeBlanc was 
arrested.  However, in February 2010, the charges were nolle prossed, and the case was 
  While State Farm was reviewing LeBlanc’s reimbursement 
request, LeBlanc’s wife contacted the insurance agent’s office and gave a slightly 
different version of the events that led to the towing of the Sable. 
                                              
 1 According to the State Farm insurance agent’s office, LeBlanc said he had hit a 
tree on Route 322 after a tire blew out.  LeBlanc claimed that this was not the story he 
told State Farm, but he admitted that he made up a story about why the Sable needed to 
be towed. 
 
 2 LeBlanc asserts that reimbursement for towing was not a part of his insurance 
policy, but was a courtesy service offered by his agent. 
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dismissed.3
In October 2010, LeBlanc initiated a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
against Assistant District Attorney Craig Stedman, Chudzik, Zell, Morgan, Pappas, John 
Doe (Chief of Police), and the County of Lancaster.  He presented claims of false arrest, 
false imprisonment, conspiracy, and malicious prosecution.  Defendants filed motions to 
dismiss.  The District Court dismissed the claims against Stedman, Chudzik, Morgan, 
Doe, and Lancaster County, as well as the conspiracy claim.  The District Court 
converted Zell’s motion into a motion for summary judgment and granted the motion.
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II. 
  
After discovery, Pappas filed a motion for summary judgment, which the District Court 
granted.  LeBlanc timely appeals and requests a temporary preliminary injunction and 
restraining order.   
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We review district court 
decisions regarding both summary judgment and dismissal for failure to state a claim 
under the same de novo standard of review.”  
Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 
822, 826 (3d Cir. 2011).  “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal
                                              
 3 The Assistant District Attorney assigned to prosecute the criminal action was 
Brian E. Chudzik. 
, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations omitted).  
 4 After LeBlanc filed the complaint, he filed multiple motions for appointment of 
counsel and to compel discovery.  The District Court denied all the requests. 
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Summary judgment is granted when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 
256 F.3d 120, 130 n.6 (3d Cir. 2001).  We review the District Court’s orders regarding 
discovery matters and appointment of counsel for abuse of discretion.  See Anderson v. 
Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d 261, 281 (3d Cir. 2010); Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 
155 n.4 (3d Cir. 1993).  We may affirm on any basis supported by the record.  United 
States v. Agnew
III. 
, 407 F.3d 193, 196 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 A. 
Discussion 
  1. Stedman, Chudzik, Morgan 
Motions to Dismiss 
 LeBlanc’s claims against Assistant District Attorneys Stedman, Chudzik, and 
Morgan revolve around the charging documents.  LeBlanc alleged that Morgan failed to 
verify the information that he received from Pappas before agreeing that charges should 
be brought, and that Chudzik and Stedman failed to come forward with evidence that he 
did not file an insurance claim.  Prosecutors, however, are immune from suit under § 
1983 when “act[ing] within the scope of [their] duties in initiating and pursuing a 
criminal prosecution.”  Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 410 (1976).  This protection 
encompasses prosecutors’ activities in connection with preparing and filing charging 
documents, such as the information and arrest warrant.  Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 
129 (1997).  Consequently, Stedman, Chudzik, and Morgan were immune from suit, and 
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the District Court properly dismissed the claims against them.    
  2. Lancaster County 
 To state a § 1983 claim against Lancaster County, LeBlanc must identify a county 
policy or custom that caused the his injury.  Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
436 U.S. 658, 689 (1978).  A policy or custom must be established by “showing that a 
governmental policymaker is responsible by action or acquiescence for the policy or 
custom.”  Jiminez v. All Am. Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 250 (2007).  LeBlanc 
baldly stated that Lancaster County had a policy of accepting criminal charges and 
prosecuting without verifying the truth to the charges.  This was insufficient to state a 
claim against Lancaster County.  See Iqbal
  3. John Doe, Chief of Police 
, 556 U.S. at 678. 
LeBlanc’s claim against the Chief of Police also fails, as he did not allege facts to 
demonstrate the Chief of Police’s personal involvement with his arrest, imprisonment, or 
prosecution.  As the District Court recognized, a civil rights claim “cannot be predicated 
solely on the operation of respondeat superior.”  Rode v. Dellarciprete
  4. Conspiracy Claim 
, 845 F.2d 1195, 
1207 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 To demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy under § 1983, “a plaintiff must show 
that two or more conspirators reached an agreement to deprive him or her of a 
constitutional right under color of law.” Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Phila., 5 F.3d 
685, 700 (3d Cir.1993), abrogated on other grounds by United Artists Theatre Circuit, 
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Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392 (3d Cir.2003).  LeBlanc did not allege facts 
suggesting an illicit agreement.  He simply stated that defendants “acted in concert to 
falsely arrest and imprison [him].”  Therefore, his allegations failed.  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
at 678.  
 B. 
  1. Zell 
Summary Judgment 
 LeBlanc's claims against Zell for false arrest or false imprisonment are barred by 
the two-year statute of limitations.  See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(1); Garvin v. City of 
Phila., 354 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 2003). The statute of limitations for a claim of false 
arrest or false imprisonment begins to run “at the time the claimant becomes detained 
pursuant to legal process.”  See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 397 (2007).  The statute 
of limitations thus commenced when LeBlanc waived arraignment in March 2008.  See 
id. at 391.  LeBlanc’s § 1983 action was filed in October 2010, beyond the expiration of 
the limitations period.5  Zell was therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law.6
                                              
 5 We do not decide LeBlanc’s claims of false arrest and false imprisonment 
against Pappas on the basis of the statute of limitations.  He filed a § 1983 action against 
Pappas raising these claims in 2009, see E.D. Pa. No. 09-1685, and reinstated them after 
the insurance fraud and conspiracy charges were nolle prossed.  See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 
393-94. 
 
 
 6 The District Court did not address the malicious prosecution claim against Zell, 
which is not barred by the statute of limitations.  See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 
484 (1994).  This failure is harmless error, as there is no set of facts on which LeBlanc 
may recover on his malicious prosecution claim against Zell.  See Hancock Indus. v. 
Schaeffer, 811 F.2d 225, 229 (3d Cir. 1987), infra § III.B.2. 
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  2. Pappas 
 The District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Pappas. 
To prove false arrest or false imprisonment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the police 
lacked proper cause to arrest him.  Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 634-36 
(3d Cir. 1995).  Generally, the existence of probable cause is a question of fact.  Groman, 
47 F.3d at 635.  However, a district court may conclude “that probable cause exists as a 
matter of law if the evidence, viewed most favorably to [the p]laintiff, reasonably would 
not support a contrary factual finding.”  Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist.
  “[P]robable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the 
arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person 
to believe that the offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.”  
, 211 F.3d 782, 
788-89 (3d Cir. 2000). 
Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 1995).  Where an arrest is made 
pursuant to a warrant, establishing a lack of probable cause requires a plaintiff to show 
“by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that the police officer knowingly and 
deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions 
that create a falsehood in applying for a warrant;” and (2) that “such statements or 
omissions are material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.”  Wilson v. Russo
 LeBlanc argues that probable cause did not exist because Pappas never proved that 
LeBlanc submitted an insurance claim for the Mercury Sable.  While it is disputed 
, 
212 F.3d 781, 786-87 (3d Cir. 2000).   
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whether LeBlanc’s towing reimbursement request was an insurance claim or simply a 
courtesy request, see supra n.2, this discrepancy is immaterial.  “[W]e are concerned here 
only with the question of probable cause, not [LeBlanc’s] guilt or innocence.”  Wright v. 
City of Phila., 409 F.3d 595, 603 (3d Cir. 2005).  State Farm insurance agents believed 
that LeBlanc had submitted an insurance claim, and this belief was relayed to Pappas.  
Pappas noted this belief in the affidavit of probable cause, along with State Farm’s record 
that on October 10, 2007, LeBlanc had represented to State Farm that he had struck a tree 
along Route 322 while operating the Sable, and that on November 2, 2007, LeBlanc’s 
wife contacted State Farm, inquiring about the status of claim and reporting that LeBlanc 
had struck a tree on a different road.  Pappas contrasted these representations with his 
October 2007 domestic disturbance investigation, which revealed that the Sable was 
damaged and required towing after LeBlanc drove his truck into it.  The affidavit also 
noted that the insurance investigator commented that LeBlanc was pushing for a quick 
settlement.  These statements in the probable cause affidavit were all supported by police 
reports and State Farm’s auto claim service and investigation report.  Moreover, LeBlanc 
failed to show that Pappas had reason to doubt any of the evidence.  Cf. Baker v. 
McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145-46 (1979) (sheriff executing an arrest warrant not required 
to investigate independent every claim of innocence).  We therefore agree that the police 
had probable cause to arrest LeBlanc, as the information within Pappas’ knowledge 
would warrant a reasonable person to believe that LeBlanc had committed insurance 
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fraud or conspiracy.7  Similarly, because probable cause existed as to the charges, 
LeBlanc’s malicious prosecution claim must fail.8  See McKenna v. City of Phila., 582 
F.3d 447, 461 (3d Cir. 2009) (to prevail on malicious prosecution claim, plaintiff must 
show the criminal proceeding was initiated without probable cause).  Simply put, 
summary judgment was proper because the evidence, viewed most favorably to LeBlanc, 
simply would not support a finding that probable cause did not exist.  See Merkle
                                              
 7 A person commits insurance fraud if he “[k]nowingly and with the intent to 
defraud any insurer. . .  presents or causes to be presented to any insurer . . . any 
statement forming a part of, or in support of, a claim that contains any false, incomplete 
or misleading information concerning any fact or thing material to the claim.”  18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 4117(a)(2). 
, 211 
F.3d at 788-89.   
 
 “A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person . . . to commit a crime if 
with the intent of promoting or facilitating its commission he: (1) agrees with such other 
person . . . that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct which constitutes 
such crime . . . ; or (2) agrees to aid such other person . . . in the planning or commission 
of such crime.”  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 903(a).  
 
 8 LeBlanc also argues that it was “fatal error” that Pappas did not produce all the 
documentation he received from State Farm insurance in his motion for summary 
judgment, as one of Pappas’ reports indicates he received 23 pages of claim information 
from State Farm.  But the applicable rule places no requirement on a summary-judgment 
movant to produce all evidence it obtained during discovery.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  
LeBlanc additionally contends that the evidence of State Farm’s claim service and 
investigation report is forged because “no prudent person would believe . . . [that] a 1993 
Mercury Sable would be financed by Capitol One Auto . . . [or] covered by collision 
[insurance], especially not by a lower income family.”  LeBlanc, however, failed to 
support this bald assertion with any evidence, meaning it could not defeat summary 
judgment.  See Doe v. Luzerne Cnty., 660 F.3d 169, 175 (3d Cir. 2011).     
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 B. 
 LeBlanc argues that the District Court abused its discretion in denying his multiple 
motions to compel discovery and appoint counsel.  He contends that the denials 
prevented him from submitting evidence that the towing reimbursement he requested 
from State Farm was not part of his insurance policy.  As discussed above, whether 
LeBlanc’s towing reimbursement request was an insurance claim or simply a courtesy 
request was immaterial.  LeBlanc’s claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and 
malicious prosecution turned on the question of probable cause, not LeBlanc’s guilt or 
innocence.  
Motions to Compel Discovery and Motions for Appointment of Counsel 
See Wright, 409 F.3d at 603.  Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse 
its discretion by denying his motions to compel discovery.  See In re Fine Paper Antitrust 
Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 818 (3d Cir. 1982).  Similarly, the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying LeBlanc’s motions for appointment for counsel.  See Tabron
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
LeBlanc’s motion for a temporary preliminary injunction and restraining order is denied.  
, 6 
F.3d at 156-58. 
See NutraSweet Co. v. Vit-Mar Enters., Inc., 176 F.3d 151, 153 (3d Cir. 1999). 
